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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

MORE LESSONS FROM JAPAN
END INDUSTRYWIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?l
Robert H. Lande
University of Baltimore
and

Richard O. Zerbe
University of Washington

I.

INTRODUCTION

The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management
techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is
staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese
efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques
will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and
fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their
economic systems and cultures.
There remains an important aspect of the Japanese economic system
that could contribute significantly to the efficiency of the United States
economy that has received scant attention; the Japanese collective
bargaining structure. Japan has very little effective industrywide
collective bargaining. Unlike the United States, in Japan the most
important labor negotiations typically occur at the plant level, or at
most at the company leveI.2 In the United States, of course it is possible
for all the employees in an industry to bargain together, collectively,
against all the management of that industry. In other words, the antitrust
exception enjoyed by unions allows all the workers in an industry to
"conspire" to fix their own wages, and all the employers in the industry
to "conspire" to negotiate in opposition. 3 This exemption attempts to
promote the national goal of providing for potential equality in
bargaining strength between labor and management. 4 The current labor
exemption to the antitrust laws may not, however, be the most efficient
way to achieve this goal.
Our alternative is to treat unions identically to corporations under
the antitrust laws. In this article we contrast the efficiencies and
inefficiencies of this alternative with those arising from the existing
labor exemption. We contend that the current United States system
may promote unnecessary inefficiencies which retard the United States
economy. Our alternative would allow, for example, most, but not all,
horizontal union mergers (or union attempts to organize workers or
union attempts to work together or to form joint ventures) and virtually

all vertical and conglomerate union alignments. But our proposal would
not allow all the workers (or the employers) in a large industry to
"conspire" to affect wages, hours, or working conditions.
We propose that the Japanese management/labor relationship be
studied more closely and that their lack of industrywide collective
bargaining be considered as the rule in the United States. We show that
our proposal rests comfortably between the existing U.S. and Japanese
positions and we raise the possibility that our approach would combine
many of the strengths of each nation's systems, while avoiding many
of the weaknesses inherent in each. It could, we believe, provide for
labor-management bargaining equality, yet do so in a significantly
more efficient manner that the existing system.
II. THE JAPANESE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
The current Japanese collective bargaining system starts with the
goal of worker-management equality (similar to that in the U.S.), that
is "to elevate the status of workers ... [to] equalize standing with their
employers [s]" Japanese Law No. 1740fJune 1, 1949, art. 1 (amended).5
But the Japanese system has evolved in a dramatically different direction.
In Japan, unions are primarily organized on a plantwide basis.
Even different plants within the same company typically have separate,
truly independent unions. Unions, or effective collections of unions,
spanning more than one employer are almost nonexistent; approximately
90 percent of unionized workers in Japan belong to company-specific
"enterprise unions."6 And, while national federations of enterprise
unions do exist, they are loosely organized, with small staffs, and only
have the power to advise the enterprise unions on negotiating goals and
tactics. 7 These federations do provide advice concerning the enterprise
unions' annual "spring offensive" and also engage in political activity.
They are similar to our trade associations, and there are no organizations
in Japan comparable to the United Automobile Workers, the United
Steel Workers, or the Teamsters. A Japanese Ministry of Labor study
showed that only 5 percent of labor negotiations surveyed involved
union officials from outside the company.8 Compare this to the
coordinated activity among constituent unions comprising typical United
States national labor organizations.
Not only is the bottom line in Japan that each enterprise union
acts independently. The U.S. notion that all comparable workers within
an industry should be paid comparable wages is not a significant
concern in Japan. Competition on the basis of labor rates has not been

30

ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL

SEPTEMBER 1990

eliminated. 9
The Japanese system can be explained better by sociology than
by government regulation. It evolved in part from the paternalistic
attitude of Japanese employers towards their workers, and the sense of
obligation and loyalty on the part of Japanese workers towards their
companies. The system arose from the same ethic which produces
exceptionally hard workers who take pride in the quality of their
teamwork, their ultimate products and services, and the reputation of
their company. Japanese employers take a great deal of interest in the
"non-business" aspects of employee' lives - firms are much more
likely to playa role in securing employee housing, or schooling for
employees' children, or to arrange company social events, than are
U.S. companies. This has led to a close relationship between labor and
management and a desire on both sides to avoid labor strife. And, of
course, major employers typically offer lifetime security to permanent
employees. For all these reasons, Japanese employees generally think
in terms of movement within a company rather than movement between
companies. Their attention is focused on their company rather than
upon their trade. A worker at Toyota or Honda tends to identify himself
or herself as an employee of that company, rather than as an auto
worker or a member of the Japanese equivalent of the UA W. iO
The Japanese system of plantwide or company-wide unions
provides workers with many of the same types of benefits sought by
American unions (these will be discussed in more detail later in this
article). For example, such unions may be able to prevent opportunistic
behavior by employees or their employer, provide credibility for longterm contracts, and prevent public goods/free rider problems. By contrast
with American unions, a plantwide or company-wide union may become
more attuned and responsive to the particular needs of its plant or
company.11 This can help the employer, both directly and indirectly, by
further cementing workers' loyalties to their company.
The Japanese system is not without deficiencies. Many unions in
Japan are unduly weak, ineffective and dominated by management.
They typically have meager strike funds and their leaders often lack
organization or negotiation skillsY In short, even though Japanese
unions are coextensive with their employer's plant or company, they
may not achieve equality, in terms of effective bargaining power, with
management.
We emphasize that we are not proposing that the United Stat~s
adopt the Japanese system. Our proposal would, in fact, permIt
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ooperation or mergers between modestly sized horizontally competing

~nions, and virtually any vertical or horizontal arrangement between

I

unions. Any absolute size thresholds for effective union management,
negotiating ability, organizing expertise, or fi~ancial strength, .would
be obtainable through small honzontal, or VIrtually any vertical or
conglomerate union mergers or cooperative agreements. Similarly,
such mergers or other arrangements should also allow unions to pool
their resources for political activities.
III.

i

I

THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM: GOALS, BENEFITS AND
COSTS

The United States has experienced a difficult time striking an
appropriate balance between industry and union strength. Overly harsh
legal repression of unions has been followed by overly generous
encouragement. 13 One major form of this encouragement was to exempt
unions from most applications of the antitrust laws.
The antitrust exemption originally arose from Congress' desire
to allow workers to form effective unions. Congress understood that
workers needed a union to enable them to negotiate as potential equals
with management (the same overall goal as the Japanese system).14
Congress desired equality of bargaining potential, and a partial
exemption of unions from the antitrust laws is required for unions to
exist at all (since most significant unions can be considered conspiracies
in restraint of trade). But the exemption that now exists is at least as
much a creation of the courts as of Congress. It allows multiemployer
and even industrywide collective bargaining (i.e., all of the employees
in an industry can join one union, or separate unions can unite in their
bargaining negotiations)Y This creates monopoly power and imposes
efficiency costs that do not appear to be required to satisfy congressional
intent or by considerations of sound public policy.

A.

Benefits From Unions
The existence of unions may promote efficiency. Unions may be
a mechanism to reduce contract costs where the firm or employees
invest in specific human capital. 16 In the absence of unions, both
employer and employee have an incentive to extract rents
opportunistically. The union may be able to enhance the credibility of
workers and ensure the performance oflong-term contracts by preventing
individual workers from acting opportunistically. At the same time, the
union provides a credible threat (strike) against companies that attempt
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Costs From the Existing Labor Exemption
opportunistic behavior. Thus, the existence of unions both helps to
B.
1. Monopoly Aspects
encourage efficiency and also to ensure that workers obtain a "fairer"
The arguments against monopoly power that are applied to
portion of these rents. Some of these efficiencies might depend on the
companies apply with equal force to unions. In both cases prices are
size ofthe bargaining unit. We have, however, discovered no important
higher; there is a loss to consumers and deadweight social loss. A
examples of efficiencies that require unions larger than the plant or
recent study of 253 NLRB representation elections from 1962 to 1980
firm, other than economies of organization and bargaining.
found that stock prices fell both when a petition for union election was
There is also a public goods argument for the existence of
unions. 17 Many features of the work place, such as safety conditions, I filed and when a union was certified as bargaining agent. 19 The fall in
stock prices was greater in the cases in which unions ultimately won
pollution levels, comfort, the speed of the production line, and the
the election. Thus, the negative aspects of unions appear to out-weigh
grievance procedure, have a public goods quality. Many people get the
their economic benefits to companies.
gains or no one does. Any individual worker has an insufficient incentive
Greg Lewis finds that existing studies on the relative effects of
to provide information on these matters to management because benefits
unions
on wages (there have been over 200 such studies since 1967)
accrue to workers collectively. Unions can provide a "voice" and be
shoW an average union-nonunion wage differential of about 15
efficient suppliers of information to management.
Finally, unions may arise and persist as a means of monitoring I percent. 20 Freeman and Medoff, who are generally very supportive of
unions, estimate the economic efficiency loss due to unions' wage
the effectiveness of management. 18 That is, badly managed firms might
effects
of between $5-10 billion per year. 21 Their calculations also
attract unions, who may be better able to monitor certain management
imply a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consumers to union
inefficiencies and offer helpful advice to management. Thus, the firm
members of about 10 times this amount.
could realize gains from implementing more effective use of its labor
2. Rent Seeking
force. The view of unions as efficient providers of services has
The
existence of union monopoly power is also the vehicle for
considerable support in the empirical literature. For example, unionized
wasteful rent seeking when unions and some employers conspire to
firms appear to have greater productivity than nonunion firms, and the
raise rival employer's costs. Because firms often have different capital!
quit rate is much lower for unionized companies, a fact consistent with
labor ratios, different safety conditions, or different ways of doing
the notion that unions may supply credibility to ensure long-term
business, a strategy which raises price by increasing the costs in industry
contract fulfillment.
The question that arises is whether or not there exists a labor policy , can be profitable to the rent seeking firm. For example, if labor costs
are raised, more capital intensive firms may gain a competitive advantage
option that is consistent with the potential for equality of bargaining
from
an industrywide price increase. This type of rent seeking produces
(congressional intent) that will permit the efficiencies of unionization
social loss beyond the usual deadweight loss associated with monopoly
and allow unions to protect workers rents, but that is more efficient that
power. In contrast to the simple monopoly case in which the efficiency
the current exemption. We have found no evidence that the existence
of monopoly power by unions (i.e., industrywide collective bargaining) , loss is only the deadweight loss which results from an increase in price,
competitive restrictions that increase costs lead to an efficiency loss
is necessary for, or even related to, those aspects of unions that promote
efficiency or protect workers' rents. Thus, current antitrust principles f that includes the entire increase in cost.
There are no estimates of the costs of such rent seeking. This
suggest a program for achieving better public policy toward collective
behavior must, however, be common and the costs substantial. 22 In the
bargaining. Considerations of efficiency, as well as the logic of the
rent seeking that occurs via predatory pricing, the costs to the predator
equality objective, require that unions, like their companies, be subject
are immediate since profits are lost due to the lower price. The gains
to market power restraints.
are speculative and occur, if at all, in the future since they arise only if
the low prices affect subsequent pricing decisions or other rivalrous
behavior. In contrast, cost-raising rent seeking results in immediate and
!
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certain gains. Since the finn gains an immediate relative cost advantage
vis-a-vis its competitors, the predator need not sacrifice short-tenn
profits, and the risks of failure are less severe. Unlike the case of
predatory pricing no deep pocket or superior access to infonnation is
required.
Two brief examples illustrate how the existing labor exemption
allows rent seeking behavior to occur: a leading labor law case, Local
Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and the otherwise
quite unremarkable case of Adams Dairy v. St. Louis Dairy, 260 F. 2d
47 (8th Cir. 1958).
Jewel introduced prepackaged self-service marketing of meat in
its supennarkets. However, it participated in a multiemployer negotiation
with the butchers' union which resulted in a a provision that:
Market operator hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on
Monday through Saturday inclusive. No customer shall be
served who comes into the market before or after the hours
set forth.
This provision would eliminate the advantages of Jewel's prepackaging
plan, which allowed customers who shopped at other hours to purchase
meat. Convenience in shopping hours is an extremely important aspect
of quality in the retail grocery market, and the restriction on marketing
meat after 6:00 p.m. would reduce Jewel's ability to compete by
offering more convenient hours. Rivals not offering these convenient
hours clearly would have gained from the restriction, since it affected
Jewel more than them. Jewel objected to this provision and sought to
have it eliminated as violation of the antitrust laws. However, the Court
found the hours provision to be a legitimate subject for collective
bargaining and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws even though
the hours that the butchers worked were not directly extended by the
arrangement.
In the Adams Dairy case, Adams, a new entrant into the St. Louis
dairy market, was subjected to a multiemployer labor contract with a
provision that in effect singled it out. Prior to Adams entry, retail sales
of milk to grocery stores had been small in comparison with sales of
home-delivered milk. 23 Adams introduced the sale of milk in paper
cartons at grocery stores and sold its milk at a lower price than homedelivered milk. The Milk Drivers Union served as bargaining agent for
the employees of various dairies, and delivery costs were a substantial
fraction of milk's retail price. Under the union contract drivers received
a base salary plus commissions detennined by the volume of milk
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delivered. 24
The new contract provided that the commissions paid to drivers
be increased substantially if the volume of milk delivered on a route
exceeded a specified volume. In addition, any driver whose route was
split was to receive special compensation. Adams was the only dairy
with any routes with deliveries above the specified level, and the extra
cost to Adams from the new contract was substantiaJ.25 Because Adams'
drivers made milk deliveries to supennarkets, Adams' 12 routes were
high volume routes. The extra cost to Adams should have been about
$43,200 per year in 1950 dollars. Adams' response was to hire 10 new
trucks and drivers and split the routes which, of course, meant lower
salaries to the previous drivers. Four years later, at the end of the
contract, Adams was using 34 routes to handle deliveries, compared to
12 originally. Adams' drives, however, organized their own separate
union and signed a new contract; Adams then reduced the number of
routes. Adams had to buy new truck, hire new drivers and fundamentally
change the way it did business.
Much of labor law is made up of just such cases. 26 Moreover, a
not insignificant portion of labor negotiations may be viewed as wasteful
rent seeking by unions and/or companiesY Of course, the existence of
union monopoly power allows and encourages this type of behavior.
Yet, the law generally cannot differentiate legitimate collective
bargaining from illegitimate rent seeking.
Under existing law it is extraordinarily difficult to detennine
whether a particular union/management agreement represents the efforts
of both sides to secure legitimate goals, or to raise the costs of rival
employers.28 The result - a labor provision which raises costs - is
often consistent with either explanation. The legality or illegality of
rent seeking in a union context turns on such questions as the intent of
the union and the rival employers, whether the subject at issue was one
of the mandatory subjects of bargaining, whether the restraint in question
operates directly on the labor market or only indirectly affects the
market, and whether the employers had the agreement thrust upon
them or whether they actively sought it. These distinctions have no
basis in economic theory and are at best difficult and in many cases
impossible to show. Current legal restrictions will catch only the unwary
and the unwise. For the sophisticated, it is easy in a multiemployer
bargaining unit to present an appearance that conforms with the law
while achieving an effect consistent with rent seeking. Thus, rent
seeking problems arise naturally from existing labor exemption and

,
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there is no way that the existing framework distinguished beneficial
cases from harmful ones. In the next section we propose one way out:
change the overall framework of the labor exemption.

I

IV. A BETTER BALANCE?
Our proposal to eliminate the monopoly aspects of the labor
exemption yet retain unions' efficiencies is simple and straightforward:
treat unions and corporations equally and symmetrically with respect'
to mergers, and forbid agreements between unions to restrain trade if
similar agreements between corporations would be illegal. This approach
would treat unions and corporations alike under the antitrust laws: for
both unions and corporations we would permit union mergers, joint
ventures, etc., except those for which the anticompetitive potential was
likely to outweigh the procompetitive benefits. Conglomerate and
vertical agreements between unions or mergers would, of course, usually ,
be allowed. A further provision to ensure equality of bargaining ability I
would be to allow unions within a single company to merge regardless I
of the companies' or unions' market shares (that is, a union could
always be at least as large as its company). We would also exempt
completely unions representing only a small number of workers.
To implement this approach, the Justice Department and/or the
Federal Trade Commission could develop a set of merger guidelines
for unions similar to those now used for corporate mergers. Under the
Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, virtually all horizontal
corporate mergers up to approximately an Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) increase of 50-100 (depending upon the postmerger HHI) are
allowed. The basic methodology for applying the Guidelines' analysis
is (1) define the relevant product and geographic markets; (2) calculate
the concentration level within that market and the increase in
concentration due to the merger; and (3) determine the effect of a large
number of factors (or potential defenses) that will make the government '
more or less likely to sue. Perhaps the simplest way to resolve the
trade-off for unions is to use these same approaches and standards for I
union mergers as well. Thus, union mergers would only be permitte.d
up to the Guideline limits. After these levels the union could grow If
their companies hired additional workers, but the unions could not
engage in merger or in unionizing unaffiliated workers if this would
violate the Guidelines. Similarly, all cooperative agreements between
unions would be permitted if the unions involved would be permitted

i
I

I
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to merge, or if similar agreements would be legal if undertaken by

corporations. Agreements between large, horizontally competin~ unions,
however, could -lik~ similar arrangements between large, honzontally
competing corporations - be found to be illegal under the antitrust
lawS.
The implementation of these simple proposals would have a
number of important benefits. Union monopoly power would be reduced,
as would the rent seeking that arises from it. Competition would be
permitted among unions within an industry, and am?~g union lea~~rs,
with all of the resultant desirable effects of competItIOn. CompetItIOn
among unions would determine which union could convince workers
that it could secure the best benefits and working conditions for its
members, perhaps weeding out inefficient unions and union leaders.
This competition could also weed out corrupt union leaders who pay
themselves too much, take bribes, or sell out to management. It could
also make unions move responsive to their members.
Any organizational or bargaining advantages inherent in large
size could be realized through small horizontal, or virtually any vertical
or conglomerate merger or agreement. Indeed, we fully expect that
such mergers or other forms of cooperation would be common. Any
union which believed, for example, that it lacked adequate strike funds
or organizing or negotiating experience, could enter into any merger to
give it the necessary strength as long as. it did not violate the M~r~er
Guidelines. Alternatively, the union mIght be able to form a Jomt
venture which would accomplish its goals. These arrangements
constitute a large part of our answer to those who might believe that
our proposal would lead to small, weak, uniformed, underfinanced
"company" unions.
Thus, we believe that our profered approach is halfway between
the current U.S. and Japanese models. It would continue to permit the
realization of union-generated efficiencies and protection of workers'
rents. It would continue to provide equality of bargaining positions.
But it would avoid both the rent seeking and monopoly aspects of the
U.S. system, and the union weakness inherent in the Japanese system.
Our halfway solution might well combine the best features of each.
The reduction in monopoly power resulting from our prosposal
should also enhance the public image of unions. Union growth would
depend more on the unions efficiently meeting workers needs and in
contributing to the production process than on their monopoly power
or rent seeking ability. Good unions (and union leaders) to a far greater
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extent would tend to drive out bad ones. And, it would be less likely
that segments of the economy would become un competitive due to
higher costs arising from union monopoly power, thus increas~ng the
potential number of unionized workers ..Our pr~posals ~ay, mdee~,
stimulate union growth. Currently, a major bamer to theIr growth IS
employer opposition. But if unions are less likely to g~in monop?ly
power, employer resistance will diminish. Employers WIll for the fIrst
time have the opportunity to obtain union efficiencies yet avoid
monopoly power.
The costs of our proposal are several. First, there is a trade-off
between union size and multiemployer bargaining on the one hand and
negotiating costs on the other. Since our proposal woul~ reduce t~e
size of some bargaining units, it may well cause small mcreases III
negotiating costs in these cases. Further, during a transition period we
might expect collusive activity, given unions' .established patte:ns ~f
behavior. A law which attempted to stop umons from engagmg III
certain types of conspiracies, cooperation, or mergers, would
undoubtedly be ignored and resisted, at least initially. It could also
have short term negative effects on worker morale and productivity
and might lead to violence by disgruntled union members.
Moreover, unions could still observe each others' behavior and act
interdependently. So would employers. One employer would be reluctant
to give in to wage demands unless it knew that its rivals would also.
Employers and unions would both have an incentive to behave like
oligopolists. Further, one practical problem could arise from this ~aper.'s
approach: it would require evaluating mergers between corporatIons III
terms of both corporate and union market shares (and other factors).
We recognize that our approach stands little change of cu~ent
implementation due to political constraints. Existing uni~ns are unlIkely
to be broken up. An alternative approach would be to Implement our
proposal only prospectively. This would mean that ~nio?s not already
united could not do so if this would violate the GUIdelmes. It would
also mean that unions within new companies might be prevented from
joining existing national unions if this would violate· the Mer~er
Guidelines. Prospective implementation would over time reduce umon
monopoly power. While prospective implementation would take time
to prevent the abuses resulting from union monopoly power, where
union monopoly power existed other companies and rival unions would
be attracted to enter the market (just as a product monopolist attracts
new entrants). These new entrants would reduce the monopoly power
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of existing unions. The effects could be similar to those seen recently
in unionized industries that have become deregulated. The deregulation
produced new entrants and made union control more difficult.

v. CONCLUSIONS
We do not contend that adopting a system halfway between the
existing Japanese and American collective bargaining structures would
cure a large portion or America's industrial woes. We also acknowledge
that the problems we discuss are much less severe than they used to be.
But this does not mean that the issue should be ignored; it is still
significant 29 and might be more so in 20 years. Much of the value of
our proposal would be to lock in place the advantages of the United
States collective bargaining system that are currently evolving and to
nudge it somewhat in the right direction.
Indeed, the fact that the labor market seems currently to be moving
towards our suggested solution might diminish political opposition to
our proposal. While in the past it was usually true that every comparable
worker within an industry received similar wages and benefits, in
recent years this rigidity has broken down. Part of this breakdown is
due to recent deregulation successes and to increased foreign
competition. Both reduce union monopoly power and given unions'
incentives to develop a two tier wage system with lower wages for new
hires. A similar arrangement arose a few years ago in the automobile
industry, where United Autoworkers union members were paid more if
they worked for General Motors than if they worked for Chrysler.
, Airline employees - pilots, machinists, and flight attendants - are
increasingly likely to be paid different wages by different firms.
Union and nonunion workers in one industry are also becoming
more common, even though this means that some workers earn more
than others for doing the same job. Because different wage rates in one
, industry and within one union create significant internal tension within
the union, perhaps a natural response has been to leave the lower paid
workers out of the union.
A significant wage differential among members of a single union
for an extended period - with or without a transfer payment among
workers (such a transfer could consist, for example, of General Motors
r workers paying a larger share of a common automobile industry strike
fund)- could cause workers' desire for multiemployer bargaining to
weaken, and could even cause an industrywide union or collective
bargaining unit to fragment. Industrywide pacts in industries such as
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steel are also experiencing greater instability, largely due to increasing
differences between the companies. Thus, there are definite signs of a
recent trend away from multi employer bargaining, and perhaps towards
a solution similar to that proposed in this paper. Perhaps our solution
will be implemented through market forces, rather than legislation.
But we do not expect the existing system to evolve rapidly enough.
Moreover, in contrast to the overall trend in antitrust towards the goal
of enhanced economic efficiency, we find no such trend involving
labor exemption cases. Further, the relatively recent labor exemption
statutes have tended to reflect either pro-union or pro-management
positions, rather than attempting to benefit the economy as a whole.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper was to raise for discussion
the desirability of adopting one Japanese collective bargaining practice,
and subjecting unions and multiemployer bargaining units to the antitrust I"
laws in a way that outlaws industrywide collective bargaining. This
proposal might substantially fulfill the primary goals underlying the r
labor exemption, but more efficiently than the prevailing system. It
might help U.S. industries acquire some of those features of the Japanese
system which may be helpful to our economy, while at the same time
avoiding the problem inherent in overly weak or "company" unions.
Whether such a solution actually would be superior to the present
system depends on several unanswered, mostly empirical, questions,
that have been discussed throughout this paper. Our purpose was to
suggest that carefully specified limitations on union monopoly power
might be in the public interest.
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23. The Herfindahl index was greater than 2000. Before Adams' entry, St. Louis dairies supplied about 27
percent and Pevely Dairy, supplied about 36 percent of the fluid milk market. In addition, an association
of smaller dairies existed and presented a solid front in union negotiations.
24. Under terms of the union contract drivers received a base salary plus commissions based on a point
system, with points determined by the volume and type of milk delivered.
25. There was some indication that the motivation behind the original union was jealousy of the high wages
of the Adams' drivers by other union members. The union may have predated against parts of itselt. A
not insignificant portion of labor law may be viewed as attempts to prevent waste resulting from one
union rent-seeking at the expense of another, or one faction within a union to acquire wealth from
another faction within the same union.
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ENHANCED CHILD RELIEF AS WORK INCENTIVE
AND POPULATION MEASURES - AN EXPERIMENT
IN SINGAPORE PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
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1. INTRODUCTION

26. See cases in note 22, supra. See also Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, lBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); Apex
Housiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (\ 944); United States v. Hutchenson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). These
cases firmly established that collective bargaining enjoys a general exemption from the antitrust laws.
27. For a rent-seeking explanation of the Pennington case see Williamson,"Wage Rates as Barrier to Entry:
The Pennington Case in Perspective," Q. 1. Econ. (1968) See also Connell Construction Co. v. Plumber
& Steamfitters, local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). As an example of further complexity, in Pennington the
union itself was a major stockholder in one of the larger coal companies affected, and had ownership
interests in three others. 381 U.S. at 733.

In the fifties and early sixties, Singapore experienced a very high
rate of population growth. l Rapid population growth imposes its burdens
on the economy in the form of a high dependency ratio, heavy social
service requirements, and a subsequent employment problem. Therefore,
"Stop At Two" was the catchword in those days. However, over the
last quarter century, rapid economic growth, full employment, and
slow domestic labour force growth due to declining birth rates have
changed the scenario completely. The culmination has been a reverse
of the Government's population policy and the replacement of the
catchword "Stop At Two" by "Three Or More If You Can Afford It" in
the mid-eighties. This article will review the use of enhanced child
relief and tax rebates as work incentive and popUlation measures in
Singapore personal income taxation in response to demographic changes
during this period.

28. Safety requirements, for example, might be an effective tool for raising costs of smaller firms.
Pashingian has shown that many environmental regulations differentially affect smaller firms.
Environmental regulations can reduce the number of plants, raise average plant size, and reduce market
share of smaller plants. Environment or safety regulations built into union contracts could have similar
effects. Pashingian, "The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor
Shares," 27 1. L. & Econ. I (1984).
29. Unions of public employees, for example, are becoming increasingly important. Our proposal might
help prevent relatively new as well as the more established unions from becoming a source of net costs
rather than benefits.
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II. ISSUES AND MEASURES
While the Government officially embarked on family planning
with the formation of the Singapore Family Planning and Population
Board in 1966, the first anti- natalist fiscal measure was put into force
when the Government announced in October 1972 that, with effect
from the year of assessment 1974, no deduction would be allowed in
respect of any child born on or after 1st August 1973 if the child was
the fourth or subsequent child. The deductions allowable for the first
three children were $750 ( Singapore currency) each for the first two
children and $500 for the third child. 2 As economic development of
Singapore accelerates, labour shortage becomes increasingly acute.
Singapore relies heavily on foreign workers. The proportion of foreign
Department of Economics and Statistics, National University of Singapore, Republic of Singapore;
presently visiting the Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Califomia 94720,
U.S.A.

